Formation of the Shiromani Akali Dal, in 1920, was a landmark in the history of the Sikhs. Prior to this, the Singh Sabha Movement had achieved remarkable success in reviving the Sikh identity. It had restored the dignity of Sikh values and strengthened the institutions of the Sikh community. Singh Sabha leaders were men of vision known for their sincerity, commitment and devotion to the cause of Sikhism. But the Singh Sabha Movement never rose to such dimensions as to assume the political leadership of the community. Its activities were mainly confined to the socio-religious and educational field. It was left to the Akali Dal to utilise the upsurge created by the Singh Sabha Movement and confront the political challenges before the Sikhs in the beginning of the twentieth century. This paper seeks to analyse the role and performance of the Akali leadership, both past and present.

          After its inception in December 1920, the first major objective before the Shiromani Akali Dal was to emancipate the Gurdwaras from the shackles of corrupt Mahants and Pujaris, who enjoyed the patronage of the colonial rule. Sardul Singh Caveeshar an ideologue of the Akali Dal wrote, ”The Sikh knows that if his religion is safe, he can certainly regain the lost liberty of his country; but if his religion is not safe, even if his country be free, there is no guarantee that he shall be able to maintain that freedom. In fact it is the freedom of his religion that is the best safeguard for the freedom of his country.”’ It was in pursuance of this policy that the Akalis were engaged in a long-drawn struggle for the control of the Sikh shrines. It was a saga of struggle and sacrifice which ended with the passage of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act in 1925.

          The popular religious upsurge during the Gurdwara Reform Movement was channelised into a powerful instrument for India’s struggle for freedom. It also suited the Congress leaders to use this newly emerging political force into their national programmes of boycott and Civil Disobedience.

Movements, Sikhs constitute less than 2% of the Indian population but they were in the forefront of the freedom struggle with 80% sacrifices. It was on the ashes of the martyrdom of Sikh freedom fighters that India built its citadel of freedom. But the bold, brave and dynamic Sikhs were led by a crop of semi-educated, second rate leaders who controlled their political destinies. They left themselves to be sacrificed at the altar of Muslim ambition and Hindu opportunism.

          Before 1947, parallel standing of the Sikhs as the third political entity in the country was duly acknowledged. But the Sikh leadership lacked caliber and statesmanship. They had no well-defined objectives to achieve. They could not visualise the emerging political scenario and the game plan of the Congress and the Muslim League, both of which were fortunate to be led by men like Gandhi and Jinnah, known for their extraordinary talent and ability. Both were legal luminaries and could plead their cases extremely well. Gandhi’s position in the Congress was unique as he had an unquestioned hold on the party. Jinnah was able, tenacious and not amenable to the lure of office, which had been such a failing of so many others. As his biographer Stanley Wolpert has written, “Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three...... Jinnah virtually conjured that country into statehood by the force of indomitable will.”

          The Sikh leaders singularly ill-equipped for leadership were engaged in petty jealousies and were often at loggerheads with one another. They lacked competence, imagination and unity of purpose. While Jinnah propounded the two-nation theory and demanded Pakistan in unequivocal terms, the demand for a Sikh homeland was nothing more than a defence mechanism to counter Pakistan. Jinnah also tried to make overtures to the Sikh leadership and offered them written guarantees of ’a fair and equitable settlement’ but the suggestion was unheeded. Sikh leaders placed their implicit trust in the verbal assurances of the Congress to provide a federal structure for free India.

          The plight of the Sikhs aroused the sympathies of many people in England. In May, 1947, the representatives of the three communities were invited to London to negotiate with the British government about the future set up of India. When the Congress and the Muslim League failed to strike any mutual understanding and Jawahar Lal Nehru decided to return to India, some influential members of the British government asked the Sikh representative Baldev Singh to stay put so that a definite proposal could be framed and finalised under which the Sikhs, instead of being a permanent minority should have a political status enabling them “to have political feet of their own on which they may walk into the current of world history.” Such a step would have been clearly in the interests of the Sikhs. But Baldev Singh deliberated over the matter, consulted Nehru and declined the offer. In a historic statement he said, “The Sikhs have no demand to make on the British except the demand that they should quit India. Whatever political rights and aspirations the Sikhs have they shall have them satisfied through the goodwill of the Congress and the majority community.”4

          Baldev Singh not only displayed a complete lack of political vision and foresight but also made an irretrievable political blunder, thereby giving a major setback to the future growth and development of the Sikh society. Sikh historians relate the post-1947 struggle of the Sikhs entirely to the suicidal step of Baldev Singh. Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala and Giani Kartar Singh were inclined to explore the possibility of some understanding with the Muslim League. Sir Stafford Cripps also advised the Sikh leaders to have a negotiated settlement with the League which could even mean a semi-autonomous unit within Pakistan. But the proposal could make no headway as the Sikh leaders held almost irreconcilable views on Pakistan which muddled the process of political bargaining. Lt. General Francis Tukar observed, ”We wished to see the Sikhs put wholly under Pakistan. But the Sikhs opted to remain with the Indian union and suffered much due to partition of the country.”5

          Decision of the Congress to accept the demand of Pakistan in order to compromise with the Muslim League for the ’larger cause’ of freedom came as a rude shock to the Sikhs who were to bear the brunt of this decision more than anybody else. It was in these circumstances that Sikh leaders put forward their claim for East Punjab.

          Partition of Punjab brought a tale of disaster, bloodshed and tears, vivisecting the Sikh population just in the middle. About 40% Sikhs were rendered homeless. Almost 2½% of the total Sikh population was brutally massacred. Their cultural and economic interests were also jeopardised. But another outcome of the partition was that the Sikhs came to be geographically concentrated in East Punjab. Punjab’s princely states were merged into one unit-the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). Soon the government of India awoke to the unpleasant reality that formation of PEPSU where the Sikhs constituted 49.5% of the population might rekindle the notion of a Sikh state in the minds of the Sikhs. It was decided to merge PEPSU into Punjab so as to create a state in which Hindus would form a permanent majority of 67% and the Sikhs should be reduced to 33%. Akali leaders, who were men of mediocre abilities, were hoodwinked into believing that it was a positive step towards the creation of a Punjabi Suba. They were naive enough to proclaim that they had won the first victory in the battle for Punjabi Suba. They joined the Congress party en masse. The only voice of dissent came from Master Tara Singh who wanted the Sikhs to retain their independent political entity. He insisted that the Akali Dal should retain its authority to take political decisions on behalf of the Sikhs. Truth dawned upon the Akali leaders after some time. Having acquiesced in the liquidation of PEPSU, they were even farther away from achieving their Suba. The constitution of free India made no provision for the protection of the Sikhs as a minority. Congress was charged with breach of faith with the Sikhs.

 It was left for Master Tara Singh to lead the struggle for the Punjabi Suba virtually alone. Two of his supporters Giani Kartar Singh and Hukam Singh had joined the Congress party. Giani became a minister in the Punjab government and Hukam Singh, some time later, became speaker of the Lok Sabha. Master Tara Singh appointed Sant Fateh Singh, a Granthi, to act as ’Dictator’ to conduct the agitation for the Punjabi Suba. The movement was an impressive show of passive resistance on a massive scale with over 57,000 volunteers courting arrest peacefully but negotiations with the government drew a blank. Thereafter both Sant Fateh Singh and Master Tara Singh took vows at Akal Takht and undertook fasts unto death, in their bid for the attainment of Punjabi Suba. But both broke their vows and terminated their fasts without achieving the desired goal. This not only lowered their prestige but also brought disgrace to the hallowed tradition of martyrdom among the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh’s political career received a fatal blow. He was down and out. He was voted out of power both by the SGPC and the Akali Dal.

 Sant Fateh Singh, who took over as the leader of the Sikhs, hailed it as an hour of his triumph and expressed jubilation over the creation of a Punjabi Suba, though actually it was nothing more than a truncated and economically crippled sub-state. Sant and his advisor Justice Gurnam Singh failed to see socio-political implications of the Punjab Reorganisation Act of 1966. In framing this Act, the government had mischievously introduced provisions (78 to 80) which were highly detrimental to the economic and political interests and future of the state and its people. Under these sections, the powers of control, administration, maintenance, distribution and development of the waters and hydel power of Punjab rivers were vested with the centre.’ Thus the state, in its power and status, came under the virtual control of the centre. The Akali leadership failed to understand that there was absolutely no need to upset the already accepted linguistic demarcation under the Sacchar (1949) and Regional (1956) Formulae. There was no necessity at all for the appointment of a boundary commission and the communally oriented 1961 census to be the basis of the new demarcation. Thus the Punjabi Suba, conceded grudgingly, could not prove to be a final and lasting solution to the problem. Unfortunately, the Sikh leadership at that time could not see through the calculated and discriminatory policies of the government against the Sikhs and the state.

Ironically, Chief Minister Gurnam Singh did not introduce Punjabi in the newly formed Punjabi Suba. He lacked courage and commitment to espouse the cause of his community and the state. Rather it was embarrassing for him when Darshan Singh Pheruman a veteran freedom fighter undertook a fast unto death on August 15, 1969 for the inclusion of Chandigarh and the left out Punjabi speaking areas in Punjab. Pheruman went through his self-inflicted ordeal for seventy four days and died a martyr’s death on October 27, 1969. Gurnam Singh had no sympathies for Pheruman since his sacrifice, by a clear implication, involved a stigma on the role of Sant Fateh Singh and the Akalis. People raised anti-Gurnam Singh slogans at the time of Pheruman’s funeral.

          Lachchman Singh Gill, who ousted Gurnam Singh with Congress support, was able to push through Official Languages Bill introducing Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as the official language of the new state. Another achievement to his credit during his short tenure was the building of a network of roads in the Punjab countryside.

When out of power, the Akali leaders thought of strategies to forge Panthic unity and wrest the Sikh votes away from the Congress. The Batala Akali Conference held on September 30, 1968 gave a clarion call for Panthic unity and formulated a new programme of reconsideration of state-central relationship. They demanded that the constitution of India should be on a correct federal basis and that the states should have more autonomy. Subsequently, a reformulated version of this programme came up in the form of Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The Akali Dal has focussed on this Resolution only at the time of launching Morchas, when they are out of power. They have used it more as a political rhetoric, rather than as a concrete political programme to be achieved. Nor have the Akali leaders made full and proper use of the powers vested in the states by the constitution. It is also well known that the Akalis have launched Morchas for the socio-political demands of the state, when they have been out of power. Once they capture power, they shun talking about these problems.

          When Gurnam Singh took over as Chief Minister for the second time in March 1969, his performance during this tenure was in no way better than his first. He had an absolute majority in the Assembly, yet he formed a coalition with the Jana Sangh as he could not thrash out problems in his own party and feared sabotage from within. In the autumn of 1969 he extended support to Indira Gandhi in her tussle with the old guard Congress leaders in getting her candidate V. V. Giri elected as President of India, with the Akali Dal support in the legislative college of votes. Gurnam Singh could have offered conditional support to Indira Gandhi. He could have used this opportunity for the settlement of Punjab issues and thus draw maximum advantage. Instead of using his bargaining power, he committed the grievous blunder of accepting Indira Gandhi’s territorial Award (January 29, 1970), whereby Chandigarh was to be transferred to Punjab and in lieu of it Haryana was to get over 114 villages in Fazilka tehsil including Abohar as compensation.’ Gurnam Singh could not have been unaware that the Award was unjust and detrimental to the interests of Punjab, yet he made a public celebration on this occasion, just to throw dust in the eyes of the people.

          After the defeat of Gurnam Singh on the floor of the House, Parkash Singh Badal was sworn in as the next Chief Minister on March 27, 1970. He formed the government with the Jana Sangh support. He failed to forge unity in the Akali ranks. Badal had to resign after 15 months of chief ministership when some Akali M.L. As. defected to Congress. Punjab Assembly was dissolved, without the Akali Dal completing a full term of 5 years. The government of India appointed a Commission of Enquiry, called the Chhangani Commission to enquire into allegations of corruption levelled against Parkash Singh Badal. Giani Zail Singh had cases of misuse of power and corruption registered against Badal in many police stations but investigations fizzled out as Badal established links with the Congress high command. In spite of having won the election with a thumping majority, the Akalis could not hold on to power on account of mutual rivalries and infighting in their ranks. Akali politics was in doldrums. In the March 1972 elections, the field was left to the Congress to secure absolute majority. When out of power, the Akali Dal launched the Save Democracy Morcha (1975), in which 45000 persons courted arrest.’ It was the most sustained opposition to the Emergency in India.

          In March 1977, the Akali - Janta coalition came into power in the Punjab under the leadership of Parkash Singh Badal. Badal’s performance was dismal on all fronts. He lacked the moral courage to persuade the Janta government at the centre to arrange the holding of elections to the SGPC, after 13 years. The elections due in 1971 were postponed by Indira Gandhi. The Akalis got into a political mess, when at a massive convention held at Ludhiana on October 28-29, 1978’ with Jagdev Singh Talwandi as president, decided to redraft the Anandpur Sahib resolution of 1973 but without any tangible results. It was a retrogressive move. Badal acquired the reputation of being docile, defensive and cowardly.

 Badal lacked the initiative to act, much less to mould events. It was a grievous blunder on his part to grant permission to Sant Nirankari Chief, Baba Gurbachan Singh, to hold a special Diwan on the auspicious occasion of Baisakhi, April 13, 1978, at Amritsar. Open denunciation of Sikh tenets by the Nirankaris and the killing of 13 Sikhs were explosive acts of religious provocation and whipped up political and communal passions in the state. People were justifiably critical of police bungling and inaction in the escape of Nirankari killers with weapons in broad daylight. The event cast a long shadow on the politics of Punjab for another decade. Badal government could not complete its full term.

 Failure of the Akalis led to a thumping victory for the Congress with Darbara Singh as Chief Minister. It was at this time that the Akali Dal chalked out a charter of economic, social, political and religious demands to be put up before the government in the form of Dharam Yudh Morcha (1982) – a fight for righteousness. In their negotiations with the government, the Akali leaders found themselves outwitted by the functionaries of the government who were planning to give a dangerous turn to events in Punjab. While the government controlled media continued to whip up anti-Sikh propaganda, the Akali Dal had no access to any media to present their version of the story. Rivalry between the so-called moderates consisting of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, Parkash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra and extremists led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale caused political havoc in the state. Bhindranwale was emerging as the champion of Sikh grievances. In their attempt to counter Bhindranwale’s growing popularity and bid for leadership, Longowal, Badal and Tohra, who had no political convictions, tried to strike revolutionary posture. Longowal administered oaths of ’do or die’ to his force of Marjeevras (alive-dead). After the oath, they never knew what to do and did nothing. These leaders failed to see the writing on the wa11 and, through their treacherous actions, they pushed the state to the brink of disaster. Horrendous attack on Darbar Sahib took place only because the Akalis were a divided lot.

 Longowal and Tohra had vowed at the Akal Takht that they would lay down their lives in the event of an attack on the Darbar Sahib. But after the attack they both surrendered. Badal secretly left for his village without taking serious note of the attack which had caused grievous hurt to the sentiments of twenty millions Sikhs all over the world.

          Unfortunately attack on Sikh shrines did not mark the end of a tragic chapter in the history of the Sikhs. Government soon launched the second phase of the military action under the ironic name “Operation Wood Rose”. Unprecedented repression was let loose in the state in the name of curbing ’terrorism’. For months, it was undeclared martial law in Punjab.’” Draconian laws were enacted which crushed the fundamental rights and liberties of the people enshrined in the Indian constitution. While the entire Sikh community felt deeply stabbed, shaken, humiliated and alienated, the government started secret parleys with the discredited and demoralised Akali leadership, who were keen to be rehabilitated. In this race of opportunism, Barnala and Balwant Singh outmanoeuvred Badal and Tohra and took Longowal along with them to Delhi to conclude an agreement known as the Memorandum of Punjab settlement signed by him and the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on July 24, 1985. The Memorandum was also called the Rajiv-Longowal Accord.

 The Accord was for the government a treaty of victory, since it gave them every thing they had tried to secure in the earlier decades and was a complete surrender of every demand and every right, the Sikhs had struggled for, since 1966. The stark surrender was that the Accord made no mention of the Blue Star attack and the Wood Rose Operation. Akalis had got what they had been rejecting before 1984. There was no amnesty for thousands of youngmen who were still in jail and would continue there for a longer period. The Akali leaders were virtually brought to their knees and made to sign on the dotted lines of the Accord, under which a major diversion of Punjab waters was later secured through the Tribunal. The very things against which the Morcha had been launched, in 1982, were accepted. The gross constitutional injustices, which were too glaring to be directly rejected by the government, were made a fait accompli by the concurrence of the Akalis. The Accord was retrogressive and a big betrayal by the Akalis led by Harchand Singh Longowal.

 The centre was playing a subtle game to provide legitimacy to the Accord through an elected Akali government and thus drain away Punjab’s waters through the construction of the SYL canal. Longowal claimed to have an unwritten understanding, which he said was more important i.e., the formation of an Akali Government after the formality of assembly elections in which the Congress would offer only token opposition. The youth had boycotted the elections as a mark of protest against that Accord. They were also in desperate need of a breathing time from the unabated repression to which they were being continuously subjected since June, 1984. In retrospect, doubts began to be cast on the bonafides of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s father Baba Joginder Singh, who had ”tricked” the youth into staying away from the elections. The Akalis were elected, as the Sikh masses had hardly any option. It was just a negative vote against the party, which had conducted the Blue Star and the Wood Rose attack and the November, 1984 massacres of the Sikhs and was responsible for their agony and humiliation. The victory of the Akalis was not a vote for the Akali policies or for the Accord, as was projected in the media.

 Surjit Singh Barnala became the Chief Minister on September 29, 1985. Balwant Singh got the finance portfolio. Badal and Tohra were in a predicament. In the matter of policy, they were a part and parcel of the old Longowal group whose opportunism became quite apparent. But in the race for loaves and fishes, Barnala and Balwant Singh had outmaneuvered them by prevailing upon Longowal to accompany them to Delhi to finalise the Accord. So while they, to some extent were sullen about having been left behind, they had neither the inclination nor the initiative and capacity to lead the community and the youth by giving it a new and cohesive policy. For obvious reasons the Akali leadership could not give any creditable performance. Their foremost aim was their own political survival. In the absence of any political programme, they could not provide a positive lead to the Sikhs. Eventually they both lent support to the Accord. In the bargain, Tohra got his men, Major Singh Uboke, Harbhajan Singh Sandhu, Prem Singh Chandumajra and Basant Singh Khalsa included in the Barnala cabinet. Badal too would have joined but he was reluctant to accept a junior berth in the cabinet.

 For all outward appearances, it was a popular government but in reality, the centre was ruling Punjab by proxy. State repression continued. Contrived encounters, as before, remained a regular feature. The Sikh youth became more and more restive, alienated and frustrated. They looked upon Barnala and Balwant Singh with hatred and anger. As a matter of fact, Barnala was a captive Chief Minister, a captive of the circumstances which were mainly his own creation. It was obvious that the Congress was using the Akalis as mere show boys to vindicate its unjust policies and repressive measures. Barnala government came to be looked upon as a mere extension of the central rule in the Punjab. It became obvious that Rajiv Gandhi had continued the old Congress policies in Punjab. The result was that the state was driven from one disaster to another.

          The Akali trio responsible for the Accord, became proverbial for their dereliction of duty towards their own people and for turning a blind eye to the agony and anguish which the community had undergone. The betrayal by Longowal had become so proverbial that when Rajiv Gandhi contacted the militant LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) leader Prabhakran to append his signatures to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord as a token of his endorsement, he is said to have remarked, ”I will not become a Longowal.” Barnala became notorious for being a puppet Chief Minister and his example began to the quoted in political circles. An Indian Express news service report from Kashmir stated that National Conference workers were viewing with suspicion any move to isolate Dr Farooq Abdullah and make him a Kashmiri Barnala.”

          Barnala Government failed to grapple with the manifold problems facing the state. The Sikh youth continued to be on the receiving end. The government faced a crisis when on April 29, 1986, a five member Panthic Committee, headed by Gurbachan Singh Manochal, made a declaration for the establishment of Khalistan from the precincts of the Darbar Sahib. Afraid of the Hindu nationalist press, Barnala took the call for Khalistan unnecessarily out of the perspective. The declaration had not posed any threat either to the Barnala government or to the peace and security of the Indian state. But Barnala was unnecessarily alarmed. Without taking his council of ministers into confidence, Barnala, under the direction of Delhi, planned and ordered a police assault, code named ’operation search’ on the Darbar Sahib complex. With this act, the centre sought to provide legitimacy to the Blue Star attack through the Sikh Chief Minister. After the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, General Dyer too had tried to impart legitimacy to his act through the pro-British Mahants and Pujaris of the Darbar Sahib, who had presented a Siropa to him, when he paid a visit to the shrine soon after the massacre.

          Jathedar of the Akal Takht issued a Hukamnama, ex-communicating Barnala for police entry into Darbar Sahib. He was asked to atone for the ’sin’ by cleaning the shoes of the congregation and recite the Granth Sahib for his spiritual purification. Barnala went through the exercise with a self-culpatory slab around his neck, ’I have sinned’. But his real sin was that his approach to the central issues was deceitful. His opportunism knew no bounds. In pursuit of his self-serving ends, he had virtually killed his conscience.

 The police action in the Darbar Sahib led to a lot of uproar in the Sikh circles and caused a split in the Akali Dal. But the centre was keen that Barnala government should get a new lease of life, so that the task entrusted to the dummy government could be accomplished through the awards of the tribunals and commissions contemplated in the Accord. Accordingly, the centre issued a directive to the Congress legislative party to extend support to the Barnala government.

 The centre used the Barnala government to pursue its policy of repression. So far the centre’s writ in Punjab had been veiled but now the veil was removed when Prime Minister, with Barnala’s full consent, decided to replace Inspector General Dhaliwal with J.F. Rebeiro, a man known for his brutality to pursue an iron fisted policy in the state. Ribeiro declared his policy of “bullet for bullet”, unmindful of the elected legislature in existence. He virtually over ruled with direct instructions from the centre. Illegal arrests and non-judicial killings became the order of the day. It was reported that Barnala had personally given the names of eighteen young Sikhs to Ribeiro to be eliminated.

          For outward appearance, the democratic process had been restored in the Punjab and an elected Akali Government was ruling the state. But outside Punjab few could know that the so-called Akali Government lacked a representative character and that things had been manipulated through unworthy men to serve unworthy ends. The foremost objective was to suck the life blood out of the Punjab economy through the digging of the SYL canal against which the Dharam Yudh Morcha was started. Barnala remained tight lipped over the matter. Nor could he secure the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab.

 Having achieved four of its objectives, namely, entry of police in the Darbar Sahib to justify Blue Star attack, securing the verdict of the Eradi Tribunal after obtaining a reference from the Barnala government to it, a virtual rejection of the proposal to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab and creating a police administration in the state which took its orders from the centre and not from the Ministry, the centre no longer found the utility of the Barnala Ministry and dismissed it unceremoniously on May 12, 1987 and imposed Governor Ray’s rule.

          Due to its self-defeating policy, the Akali Dal failed to provide a credible democratic alternative to the Congress in Punjab. The so-called Accord failed to settle the political impasse. Punjab was desperately in need of a genuine and meaningful political settlement, which could pave the way for a humane administration and provide a soothing balm to the Sikh community. The Akali leadership could not effectively mobilise the upsurge of Sikh sentiments after the Blue Star attack to their political advantage. It further added to the anguish of the Sikhs, when the Akalis came out of the political arena, with a stigma on their credentials. Having failed to take advantage of political opportunities, they just sat watching the blood bath to which the Punjab was subjected under the governor’s rule. In the elections held in February, 1992, the Akali Dal led by so-called moderates announced a boycott of the poll. The field was left for the Congress to come to power in the state after a gap of eleven years. Beant Singh, who took over as Chief Minister, indulged in untold brutalities in the name of restoring peace in the state. Beant Singh gave free hand to police Chief K P S Gill, under whom human rights violations reached further to an unprecedented scale. The Congress, though lacking a representative character and characterised by criminalisation of politics completed its full term of five years.

          On the eve of next general election in 1996, the Sikhs were leaderless, baffled and full of anguish over the grim scenario. Militants had died in their thousands but had failed to throw any front political organisation. Despite the stigma of dereliction of their responsibilities, the Akali leaders were still clamouring for power. They tried to seek salvation in the stratagem of blaming it all on their political adversaries, the Congress. Their assertion was that if the Sikhs were suffering, it was all due to the ill-conceived policies of the Congress. Their catching manifestoes aimed at arousing popular passions in favour of Akali rule which would put an end to the cruel and corrupt practices of the Congress. They placed all the pending political issues on their election agenda and also promised to bring to book all those who would be found guilty of perpetrating atrocities on the Sikh youth.

          The anti-Congress wave that swept across the length and breath of Punjab brought the Akali Dal back to power. Parkash Singh Badal, who was in political wilderness for almost two decades, managed to come to the helm of affairs as Chief Minister. Apprehending threat to his position in the party, Badal decided to form a coalition government with the BJP though without securing any commitment from them on the pending issues of water, territory, Chandigarh and autonomy. BJP’s earlier stand in relation to Punjab had been hostile and there was no reason to believe that it would be any different in future. The slogan of Punjab, Punjabi and Punjabiyat was raised by Badal, just to derive political mileage. It was not inspired by noble sentiments of Hindu-Sikh unity, as published in the media.

 The Akali Dal, in its decedent stage was used by the B JP to impose its hegemonistic agenda on Punjab and to dilute or destroy the socio-political identity of the Sikhs. Unmindful of the blood shed and trauma through which the Sikh community had passed, Chief Minister Badal did not bother to check the onslaught of the Hindutva forces to subvert the Sikh identity. The BJP-RSS combine used the opportunity to reactivate the hitherto dormant institutions of the traditional religious order like the deras, the mutts, the ashrams, the temples and a host of other religious establishments.

The persons who manned these establishments like the sadhus, the sants and the mahants were mobilised and were sent into every nook and corner of the rural Punjab, with a view to extend the BJP influence. A section of the Sant Samaj was also mobilised by the Hindutva forces. Chief Minister Badal himself was instrumental in projecting this section of the Sant Samaj. Some of the Sants were patronised by the Badal government, not out of any noble sentiments but for its self-serving ends. In Punjab standing of the Sikh community was sought to be compromised to misrepresentation of history by the communally biased writers. RSS constituted an organisation called Rashtrya Sikh Sangat, with a view to promote its agenda in Punjab. In implementing their agenda, the RSS workers were trying to hammer the point that the Khalsa as created by Guru Gobind Singh was nothing more than the sect of the Hindus.

          Badal bartered away the vital socio-political interests of the state for his self-serving political ends. He back-tracked from his political agenda announced at the time of elections, thus dashing the hopes of the electorate to the ground. On the issue of probe into grave human rights violations in the state, Badal literally developed cold feet. People had expected that the Akali government would appoint a judicial commission to probe into the acts of high-handedness and gross injustice committed during the bloody decade but their hopes were belied. After the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, the British Government had appointed the Hunter Commission which had held the firing unjustified and awarded a compensation of Rs. 2000/- each to the relatives of those killed and Rs. 500/- to the injured in the early 1920’s.

          Thousands of Sikh youth kept languishing in jails. The Akali Chief Minister could have secured general amnesty in Punjab through the support of BJP allies at the centre and thus salve the sores. But Badal was playing only second fiddle to the BJP. Mired in personal ambition he was quite contented to see his son Sukhbir Singh Badal inducted as a minister at the centre. Vital interests of the Punjab and the Sikhs were sorely compromised.

          Badal’s failure on the economic front was equally glaring. Punjab achieved the dubious distinction of being a state with the highest per capita debt. State being in the throes of a deep financial crisis, it became difficult to meet day-to-day routine expenses. This was solely on account of mismanagement of state economy. Rural indebtedness assumed alarming proportions. Punjab farmers were seething with discontent. The Akali leadership was not shaken on account of the reports of suicides committed by the peasants in the Punjab countryside. BJP government at the centre did not provide any relief to the debt ridden state. Under Badal politics became a road to riches. It was a disturbing scenario, dominated and dictated by a culture of corruption. The machinery of the government did not move without greasing the palm of the concerned persons.

          The Akali Dal not only lost its bargaining power but also missed a golden opportunity to forge a common bond with regional parties like AGP, DMK and Telgu Desam Party, who were demanding greater autonomy for the states and wanted center-states relations to be redefined. It is worth comparing Badal’s unconditional support to the BJP with the stand taken by Profula Kumar Mohanta (Assam-Chief Minister), who demanded the withdrawal of army from Assam, lifting of ban on ULFA and the scrapping of Disturbed Areas Act. Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister vociferously demanded the application of Article 370 to all the states on the J&K pattern. It was unfortunate that the B JP phobia led Akali leaders to turn a blind eye to the bloody events in Punjab of the past fifteen years. BJP on its part did not budge an inch from its earlier stand and made no change in its political agenda on Punjab.

          Always at loggerheads with one another, the Akali leadership failed to address itself to the multifarious problems confronted by the state. Roots of the problem can be traced to Badal’s hegemonistic leadership and his unbridled ambition to exercise absolute control over political and religious affairs of the Sikhs. By wresting control of the SGPC and the Akal Takht, Badal, who was already the Chief Minister and the party supremo, concentrated all authority in his own hands. Having arrogated all the authority to himself, Badal became intolerant of all dissent. One by one, all men of substance were thrown out and the Akali Dal degenerated into an undemocratic organisation. Badal kept a coterie of sycophants and minions around him who would authorise him to nominate people to positions of power. In his anxiety to promote his own kith and kin, he became autocratic and unscrupulous.

          Through their unscrupulous actions, the Akali leaders lowered the prestige of the Akal Takht, the SGPC and the Akali Dal. They also made a mockery of the time-honoured Sikh traditions. Organisational politics which brings a political party in touch with the grass roots was replaced by politics of expediency, manipulation and opportunism.

 In the race of opportunism Parkash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra tried to excel each other. Both managed to remain at the helm of affairs of the Akali Dal and the SGPC respectively for almost two decades. With their ’Banyan tree’ mentality they worked for self glorification and the duo did not allow new and committed leadership to emerge on the scene.

          The dismal performance of the SAD in the parliamentary elections (1999) was the outcome of the extreme degeneration that had crept into the party. This brings into sharp focus a sad story of Akali leadership shaken by poor performance, scandals of corruption, peasant unrest, soaring prices, financial bankruptcy and above all the alienation of the people. Bankruptcy of Sikh leadership was clearly visible in their thoughts, words and deeds. Leaders entirely cut off from the masses were pursuing policies and strategies completely out of tune with the time or the requirements of the state and the Sikh community.

Conclusion:

A survey of the role and performance of the Akali Dal, during the past eighty years rightly reveals that the party has not been able to find a political model which should protect the political, economic and cultural interests of the Sikhs and enable them to hold their heads high. The Akali Dal had earned popular acclaim for its role in the Gurdwara Reform Movement and later for pioneering the country’s struggle for freedom, with more than 75% sacrifices. But at the time of transfer of power, the Akali Dal had no leader of the calibre of Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, who could safeguard the interests of the Sikhs as the third political entity in the country. Naive as they were, the Akali leaders relinquished their bargaining power and agreed to the partition of Punjab which divided the community into two almost equal parts. As a result, the community suffered incalculable losses of unprecedented magnitude.

          The only perceptible advantage of the partition, through sheer accident, was the concentration of the Sikhs in a single territorial unit in which they could protect their political rights and identity. Their hopes were soon belied when the demand for a Punjabi speaking state was denied and no constitutional safeguards were provided to the Sikhs as a minority. It was a big political blunder on the part of the Akali leaders to give their full consent to the merger of PEPSU, the only Sikh bastion, with Punjab. This showed the inability of the Akali leaders to secure the satisfactory political arrangements for the Sikhs in India. The Akali leaders again stumbled when they entered the Congress fold en masse and relinquished their independent political status. Merger with Congress was a short term arrangement and secured no political gains for the Akali Dal.

 After leaving the Congress ranks, the Akali Dal had to wage a protracted struggle for the attainment of a Punjabi speaking state. But surprisingly the Akalis gave their consent to the Punjab Reorganisation Act (1966) though it had failed to grant the status of a full-fledged state to Punjab. Chief Minister Gurnam Singh lacked the will and the skill to put things in their true perspective. With the creation of a truncated and economically crippled sub-state, the situation became more complex and has defied solution so far. The issues assumed grim and terrifying proportions with the army assault on the Darbar Sahib and the massacre of Sikhs in Delhi and other places in November 1984. It was unfortunate that Akali leaders like Harchand Singh Longowal, Surjit Singh Barnala and Balwant Singh overlooked the trauma that the Sikhs had gone through. They held secret parleys with the government and signed the Rajiv- Longowal Accord. It was a total surrender of every demand and every right the Sikhs had struggled for since 1966. Both Surjit Singh Barnala and Parkash Singh Badal bartered away the vital interests of the Sikhs and the state for their vested interests. While Barnala played the second fiddle to the Congress, Badal blindly toed the BJP line, unmindful of the incalculable harm the Congress and the BJP had done to Punjab. The duo never bothered to take up the charter of demands or political goals put forward by them during the Morchas.

          It is unfortunate that the BJP-RSS combine has made inroads into all the premier Sikh institutions and organizations with a view to erode Sikh identity. A glaring instance of this came to light when Jathedar of the Akal Takht Giani Puran Singh, a nominee of Badal dwelt on the theme of Sikh Gurus being decedents of Lav and Kush, who were the sons of Ram. RSS has consistently argued that Hindutva alone can be the basis of India’s unity and integrity. It has categorically rejected the notion of diversity and plurality in the Indian tradition. Its narrowly focused nationalist perspective takes no cognizance of the identity of the minorities. Since April, 1999, the RSS has been actively engaged in the tercentenary celebrations of the birth of the Khalsa, with a view to propagate the mission of Guru Gobind Singh, as per their own interpretation. BJP government at the center has set a very dangerous precedent by handing over Rs. 50 crore (out of the Rs. 100 crore sanctioned for celebrating the Khalsa tercentenary) to those Hindu organisations which in the name of celebrating the Khalsa tercentenary, are cutting at the very roots of Sikh ideology. By giving a free hand to the Hindutva forces Chief Minister Badal has given a sever jolt to the Akali Dal, which represented the aspirations of the Sikh community, ever since its inception in 1920.

          There are visible signs of deterioration in Punjab’s economy. Economists have noticed a general deceleration in the growth of economy in the 1990s. Agriculture is stagnating. In the matter of unemployment, the Planning Commission has bracketed the state with Bihar, U.P. and Kerala. There are nearly 15 lakh educated unemployed youth in the state. In per capita income Maharashtra has overtaken Punjab. Leadership in Punjab has not been able to provide direction to the state’s development needs.

          Today the Sikhs are baffled, helpless and rudderless. They resent the denigration of their sacred and time honored institutions and traditions. Overt and covert moves of the Hindutva forces to dilute or destroy the socio-political identity of the Sikhs have driven the community to despair. Lack of representative Sikh leadership is at the root of the problem. There is an urgent need to salvage the Akali Dal from its present decadent state and restore its representative and democratic character.

REFERENCES:

1.      Caveeshar, Sardul Singh; ’The Akali Movement’ in Punjab Past and Present, Vol. VII, Part I (Punjabi University, Patiala, April, 1973), p. 141.

2.      Wolpert, Stanley; Jinnah of Pakistan (Bombay, 1988), p. 27.

3.      Duggal, Devinder Singh; The Truth About The Sikhs (Amritsar, n.d.), p. 16.

4.      Dhillon, G. S.; India Commit Suicide (Chandigarh, 1992), p. 8.

5.      (Lt. General) Tukar, Francis; While Memory Serves (London, 1948), p. 277.

6.      Government of India; The Punjab Reorganisation Act 1966 (New Delhi, 1966), pp. 35-41.

7.      The Tribune, Chandigarh, January 30 k 31, 1970.

8.      Dhillon; op. cit, pp. 90-91.

9.      The Tribune, Chandigarh, October 29, 1978; The Ajit, Jalandhar, October 29 and 30, 1978.

10.  For details see Citizens For Democracy; Report To the Nation: Oppression in Punjab (Bombay, 1985).

11.  Indian Express, October 4, 1989.